Leibniz’ concept of miracles

Most accounts of miracles assume that a necessary condition for an event’s being miraculous is that it be, as Hume put it, “a violation of the laws of nature”, or at least that it should not follow from the laws of nature.  However, any account of this sort will be ill-suited for defending the major Western religious traditions because, Kenny Pearce argues, classical theists are under significant pressure to reject such lawless events.

In place of the rejected lawlessness accounts, this paper by Kenny Pearce seeks to develop and defend a Leibnizian concept of miracles, on which an event is said to be miraculous just in case we can discover its final cause but not its efficient cause. In this article a particular conception of miracle is defended.







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